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Introduction
New Orleans politicians, city officials, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) repeatedly stressed housing as their number one priority following Hurricane Katrina, which by some estimates damaged 434,000 homes in the New Orleans area, destroying close to 140,000 of them. While everyone in New Orleans publicly agreed that housing remained the most critical obstacle to rapid recovery after Hurricane Katrina, local controversy stalled the siting of temporary housing after the storm. Most citizens recognized the need for facilities like trailer parks and modular homes, but many sought that these facilities be placed elsewhere. Which communities would end up hosting these trailers and their occupants is a critical but unanswered question. This paper, set against a backdrop of local opposition, investigates which communities and areas ended up being selected as hosts for FEMA travel trailers and mobile homes. We find that, controlling for a large number of factors, the strength of local-level civil society best predicts which zip codes will be chosen as hosts for more trailers and trailer parks. Those localities with more politically active and involved citizens who voted in past elections -a proxy we interpret as defining an area with stronger local ties and a more vibrant civil society -were the ones which received the fewest trailers. Conversely, those which demonstrated weaker local ties were more likely to end up hosting large numbers of trailers. This is an important finding because it reverses a nascent literature investigating the factors which facilitate a more rapid recovery from disaster. While initial research on post-disaster rebuilding focused upon the physical amount of damage or aid received by an area (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969) , or whether or not the area had learned to upgrade [2] Weatherhead Center for International Affairs mitigation systems from previous disaster experiences (Eoh 2005) , newer research links levels of social capital to the pace of rebuilding. An enormous canon of literature in sociology and political science connects higher levels of civil society, often defined as networks of trust and reciprocity among citizens, to better government performance, at local (Coffe and Geys 2005) , regional (Knack 2002) , and national (Putnam 1993 ) levels.
It is a logical extension to test to see if stronger ties among citizens can create a more efficient and rapid process of rebuilding.
Research on post-disaster situations has demonstrated that following crisis situations, individuals embedded in stronger networks have more resources, both emotional and material (Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs 2000) . Scholars illuminated the critical role played by active social capital in recovery following Turkish, Indian, and Japanese earthquakes (Özerdem and Jacoby 2006) . Others sought to connect state responses to the 2004 Indian ocean tsunami to vibrant civil societies at the local level (Tata Institute of Social Sciences 2005). Shaw and Goda (2004) showed how the 1995 Kobe earthquake enhanced Japanese civil society and allowed NGOs to play a more prominent role alongside the government in the rebuilding process. In a comparative study of India and Kobe, researchers argued that areas which displayed greater levels of trust and stronger networks were better able to recover after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Kobe earthquake (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004) .
However, we argue that civil society plays a dual role in the rebuilding process following disasters, simultaneously strengthening the ability of local citizens to engage in practices of "informal insurance" (de Allesi 1975) and overcome collective action problems, while orienting them to defend their neighborhood against unwanted but perhaps necessary projects, such as trailer parks, which speed recovery. Here, the "bonding" social capital which connects neighbors to each other may simultaneously preventing them from "bridging" beyond their own neighborhood's needs to allow in temporary trailers (Putnam 2000) . In this way, stronger local civil societies act as a dual edged swords during post-disaster situations, perhaps helping draw back refugees to their communities and providing them with support but simultaneously slowing the overall process of rebuilding in the city as a whole by stalling or preventing the siting of unwanted projects. If city planners must continuously search for new potential locations for temporary trailers and housing because of local resistance, that time and resources cannot be spent on other recovery activities. Further, such resistance slows down the placement of new housing and thus prevents refugees, workers, and administrators from returning to the affected area.
Trailers as "Public Bads"
Scholars and policymakers alike claim that temporary shelters, housing, and housing infrastructure are among the critical needs after disasters (Anderson and Woodrow 1998: 10; Richardson 2006) . In New Orleans, however, trailer parks were seen by local residents not as a solution to the housing problem, but as an additional blight which would negatively impact residents already suffering losses from Hurricane Katrina.
At Lakewood Estates in Algiers, section, local residents used human and vehicular chains to block construction and surveying equipment brought by federal workers who were supposed to begin siting a new temporary housing development. The statement of one resident who told reporters that, "I don't want my neighborhood ruined because theirs is
[sic]" epitomized the problem facing decision makers seeking to site temporary house reassurances that temporary trailers are, in fact, temporary, many communities, such as those in Florida which hosted trailer parks after Hurricane Andrew, find trailers still in place several years after disasters (Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin 1997) .
1 Some critics saw in local reactions to trailer parks evidence for continuing racial and class divisions which have plagued New Orleans for decades (Nelson and Varney 2005) . We can categorize the siting of trailer parks as another form of a "public bad" which imposes focused costs on local communities but provides diffuse benefits to cities and regions as a whole. The term public bad is used to contrast these facilities with public goods, such as lighthouses and national defense, which provide diffused benefits and are accompanied by diffuse costs. Trailers provide much needed housing for workers and families who will improve the economic condition of the city and region, but focus potential externalities, whether actual or expected, on local host communities. States and developers around the world struggle to cite such controversial facilities, including nuclear power plants, incinerators, and even old age homes (Aldrich 2005) , and temporary trailers are no exception.
Explanations for Siting Decisions
Previous research has sought to identify the factors which make it more or less likely that local residents will end up with unwanted projects in their vicinity. Some authors have focused on technocratic criteria, such as the space available in the area and the density of population. Others have underscored the potential for environmental racism, where siting authorities deliberately site unwanted projects in the backyards of ethnic and racial minorities. Socioeconomic conditions, such as poverty, unemployment, and house ownership may be linked to the potential for receiving such projects.
Following a super catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina, the amount of damage in a neighborhood may best predict outcomes. Finally, some scholars, such as Hamilton
[6] Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (1993) and Aldrich (forthcoming), argue that authorities take into account the potential for collective action in local communities. Developers and government decision makers alike recognize that areas with higher levels of social capital and volunteerism are more likely to mobilize against controversial facilities and avoid siting in such communities if possible. As such, strong civil society may act as a double edged sword: while providing "informal insurance," information, and organizational power to local communities (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996) , it simultaneously impedes the ability of local authorities to accomplish some necessary tasks after reconstruction. 
Technocratic Criteria
Developers concerned solely with nonpolitical characteristics in selecting host communities Area, population density
Discrimination against Minorities
Racial/ethnic majority punishes minority
Percentage of residents who are non-white
Socioeconomic
Wealthy neighborhoods push away facilities; poorer ones more comfortable with such projects Income, unemployment, percentage below poverty line, education level, house prices
Amount of damage
More damaged areas have a greater need for trailers and will host more
Depth of flood waters in the area

Civil Society
Mobilization against facilities depends upon trust, networks, and social capital
Percentage of eligible residents voting in elections
Different observers see dissimilar landscapes when envisioning how authorities choose where to locate public bads. Table 1 A final map of the siting landscape shows civil society characteristics. This approach centers on the relative strength of horizontal associations, the ties between individuals, and the depth of shared norms and behavioral expectations. Research on siting in North America demonstrates that private developers avoid areas with higher potential for mobilization against their projects (Hamilton 1993) . Authorities recognize that tighter-knit, well-connected communities can better overcome collective action problems. Similarly, local areas which are made up of more homogeneous constituents, i.e. areas with stronger horizontal bonds between citizens, are more likely to create zoning policies which exclude unwanted group homes then heterogeneous ones (Clingermayer 1994) . In communities with more social capital and better linkages, antifacility groups find it easier to mobilize and organize against unwanted projects.
A large body of research demonstrates that social networks are important resources for survivors of disasters. A decisive factor in rebuilding is the support labeled as "informal insurance" in which neighbors lend each other money, tools, housing, and assistance (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996) . Residents in neighborhoods with greater levels of social trust and social capital share information about bureaucratic procedures and upcoming application deadlines, work to monitor public areas to prevent dumping, and share responsibility for deterring looting. Hence research continues to stress the importance of local networks and social capital in rebuilding ( Research has shown that across nation states and in a wide variety of project types, both state authorities and private developers use pre-siting surveys to gauge the strength of local civil society. Areas which demonstrate fragmented civil society, low potential for mobilization, and weaker bonds are envisioned by the state as better hosts, as such areas will protest with less rigor than their stronger counterparts. In the North American radioactive waste siting cases, for example, researchers have uncovered how many
[10] Weatherhead Center for International Affairs companies utilized a "windshield survey" where they would drive through potential host communities and note the existence of signs of disconnectedness, low social capital, and poverty.
In one notable case, court proceedings showed that a surveyor had written "trailers everywhere" in his description of a potential host of low level radioactive waste, and then summed up the site as "in" rather than "out" (Sherman 2006) . In Japan, governmental officials surveyed the strength of local non governmental organizations in civil society, such as farmers' and fishermen's' cooperatives, recognizing that the strength of these groups strongly determined whether or not proposed nuclear power plants would overcome opposition (Aldrich forthcoming). States around the world, such as the United Kingdom, undertake similar investigations to estimate potential opposition within civil society, sometimes through straightforward surveys of local communities (Rüdig 1994: 84) . French authorities may have selected several localities in Normandy for nuclear power plants based on survey research which showed towns in that area more favorable to siting than in other regions (data reproduced in Hecht 1998: 248). Hence in New Orleans, stronger bonds at the local level may mean that authorities were forced to find better host communities for trailers elsewhere to avoid stalling and delay in the rebuilding process. To test theories connecting the strength of civil society at the local level with selection as a host for trailer parks, we follow Hamilton (1993) and use voter turnout in recent elections as a proxy for social capital and civic engagement.
We test the accuracy of these theories using data on the siting decisions for thousands of temporary trailers that the local and federal government hope to place in and around New Orleans following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. Because our dataset investigates the number of trailers and trailer parks per zip code, we must be quite careful about making inferences at lower levels of analysis. We cannot speak directly about the decision making heuristics employed by decision makers, such as Mayor Nagin and the New Orleans housing department, on a case-by-case basis.
Our strongest claims can be about the factors within zip code blocs which are correlated with greater or less numbers of temporary housing units. Mayor Nagin and his team of advisors were the primary actors who selected the final trailer park sites immediately following Hurricane Katrina. We do not know how much information these planners had access to, but we assume that it was at the broader community level as opposed to siteby-site. That is, the decision makers' impressions of local level social, racial, technocratic, and civil society factors were more than likely based solely on available data which had been recorded or intuited prior to the storm, and hence were based at broader spatial levels, such as the whole neighborhood.
One potential obstacle to zip code based analysis is the issue of spatial dependency; while there are various technical fixes for issues of spatial dependency which can be found in the epidemiological literature, we assume that zip code blocks do Table 2 below provides descriptive statistics about our data set.
[14] Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Note the enormous variation across our variables. There were an average of five trailer sites or parks per zip code, with some areas receiving only a single site and others receiving as many as 73. Furthermore, while the average zip code bloc was slated to receive more than 450 trailers, some had as few as three or as many as 3800.
Results
We used a negative binominal regression to analyze which factors impacted the number of trailers or trailer site per zip code. Table 3 below reports the coefficients from this model. To ensure that the results are not a function solely of the number of trailers, we also tested to see if these factors impacted the number of trailer sites. The coefficients from these regressions are below in Table 4 . Note here again that a number of factors were statistically significant, including the New Orleans dummy variable, population, high school and college education, and the voter turnout. Those which were both significant and had an impact were few: the Our results diverge to some degree with the conclusions of other scholars, such as Davis and Bali, who found that a number of factors, including local politics, sociodemographic characteristics, need, and site specific factors were at work in explaining the rejection of individual sites (2006) . One explanation for the discrepancy between our findings might be that Davis and Bali focused on greenfield development of individual sites as opposed to aggregate numbers at the zip code level which could either be greenfield sites or leased into existing areas.
Aldrich/Crook [21]
Conclusions
Our zip code level data support arguments that decision makers within New Orleans and FEMA took seriously the threat from better organized local communities when selecting sites for unwanted facilities. As Hamilton found in his study of the expansion of existing "public bads" (1993) and as Aldrich has argued for larger scale controversial facilities (forthcoming), developers and city authorities recognize that better organized and more easier mobilizable populations will make these siting processes more difficult. By avoiding potentially contentious areas, planners hope to speed up the process of recovery. Councilwoman Jacquelyn Clarkson, whose district includes Algiers and the French Quarter, spoke openly about her quest to ensure that any trailers placed in her district would be in locations that "don't intrude on our lifestyle." Seeing resistance to trailer as "common sense," and not NIMBY politics, Clarkson predicted early on that attempts to site trailers in the area of the Lakewood Country Club would fail, as pressure from local residents would ensure that the club "was coming off that damn list [of potential sites]." Her comment that politicians and decision makers should "know our districts better," (quoted in Nelson and Varney 2005) fits well with the model predicted by our data. That is, savvy politicians should recognize the communities where stronger bonds between citizens bring them into active participation in politics and also into siting decisions and avoid those when selecting locations for controversial projects.
Despite the mass public's agreement that housing is a critical issue for recovery post-Katrina, communities within New Orleans which are better connected to each other through bonding capital have demonstrated their ability to avoid being selected as hosts for trailer parks. Those local areas with less politically active, and hence less connected and networked communities, are more likely to be chosen as hosts for these controversial projects. Due to the opposition from well-organized locales, city planners and government officials have had to revise, cancel, and rework temporary housing plans.
While scholars may continue to envision social capital and civil society as inevitably positive, this study has sought to demonstrate that tighter local networks after disasters may have an unpredicted double-edged quality to them.
